IJERPH, Vol. 14, Pages 1578: Recycling Pricing and Coordination of WEEE Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Consumers’ Bargaining

IJERPH, Vol. 14, Pages 1578: Recycling Pricing and Coordination of WEEE Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Consumers’ Bargaining

International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health doi: 10.3390/ijerph14121578

Authors: Xiaodong Zhu Jing Wang Juan Tang

Environmentally friendly handling and efficient recycling of waste electrical on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) have grown to be a global social problem. As holders of WEEE, consumers have a significant effect on the recycling process. A consideration of and attention to the influence of consumer behavior in the recycling process can help achieve more effective recycling of WEEE. In this paper, we built a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain model composed of manufacturers, retailers, and network recycling platforms. Based on the influence of customer bargaining behavior, we studied several different scenarios of centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making, and contract coordination, using the Stackelberg game theory. The results show that retailers and network recycling platforms will reduce the direct recovery prices to maintain their own profit when considering the impact of consumer bargaining behavior, while remanufacturers will improve the transfer payment price for surrendering part of the profit under revenue and the expense sharing contract. Using this contract, we can achieve supply chain coordination and eliminate the effect of consumer bargaining behavior on supply chain performance. It can be viewed from the parameter sensitivity analysis that when we select the appropriate sharing coefficient, the closed-loop supply chain can achieve the same system performance under a centralized decision.

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